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ABSTRACT: Our research intends to present a literature review on studies regarding the audit fee 
and its cost behavioral in relation to the audit process. The purpose of the paper is to enhance and 
synthesize the main results of auditing research literature impending audit fee approximation.  Hence, 
our analysis requires a literature review methodology. We start by introducing the concept of audit 
fee;  the first  part  of  the paper follows  the  shift taking  place in the  cost  behavior  of  audit  in  a 
diachronic study methodology. The main part of the paper discusses empirical studies on audit fee by 
closely analyzing their research design, the employed research methodology and the obtained results. 
The originality of the study, its contribution relies in a consisting and comprehensive overview on 
papers in auditing research literature that presents audit fee through an empirical approach. When in 
comes to the importance and reliability of such studies further impacts upon the relevance of their 
results and how they can be used.  
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The concept of information asymmetry emerged from the studies of three very important 
economic  researchers  (Akerlof,  Spence  and  Stigliz),  thus  they  have  made  the  economic  theory 
evolve establishing the basis for modern economic theory (Riley, 2001). Their work, acknowledged 
in 2001, by a Nobel Prize was a departing point for Ng’s research (1978), which uses the theoretical 
framework  in  order  to  characterize  the  conceptual  paradigm  of  the  financial  information 
asymmetry:  the  manager  is  always  better  informed  than  the  stakeholder.  This  problem  equires 
control means for the stakeholder, and one of them is identified as, the external audit. Ng (1978) 
appreciates that the external auditors have two main functions complementing the reduction of the 
information asymmetry: they detect the eventual non-compliance to the accounting regulations and 
limit  the  discretionary  accounting  practices  of  the  managers.  Relying  on  this  theory,  Watts  & 
Zimmermann  (1986)  appreciates  that  an  audit  is  efficient,when  an  auditor  is  competent  and 
independent. One of the main characteristics of the auditor’s independence is a correct fee for the 
service. 
In this research we tried to demark a research winning the social impact of the auditing 
phenomenon quantified through the audit fee, this research is carried on which is performed by 
steadfast by two main differentiation segment: time and space, thus we consider as well the fruition 
of  the  audit  fee  parameter  from  the  auditing  phenomena  and  its  determinants.  The  study 
components of the maket at a worldwide-level for the audit services composed in a classic manner 
from: demand, offer and cost (price) in addition to the two main participants: the auditor and the 
audited), is primarily targeting another very important component cost – audit fee. We appreciate 
that this component is the most difficult to calculate and connect with its component.  
This paper evaluates research that examines the determinants of audit fees over the past three 
decades, and investigates changes observed from recently-published studies on its the quantification.  
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In what the improvement of the auditor’s autonomy is concerned, a reference study mentions 
that one of the most important trends of research is establishing the theoretical and scientific basis 
(statistical  and  mathematical)  methods  of  quantifying  the  fees  proposed  by  the  auditor; 
independently of their nature, audit fees other non-audit fees.  
Throughout the years, there have been a series of fierce debates on the subject of need to 
disclose the audit fee, and afterwards: to disclose it, but not to reveal the determinants or to whether 
establish a standard fee or not.  In each of the possibilities the economic climate was an undisputed 
determinant of audit fee behavior and perception.  
The conceptual implications of this idea generate a wider opening towards the audit fee 
paradigm determinants. We identified two breaking points that determine cost behavioral of the 
audit  fee,  first  of  all:  Savings  and  loans  crisis  (S&L  Crisis)  from  the  U.S.A.,  during  the  80’s 
determined a series of normative actions as the SOX –legislation in the US (2002), followed in the 
2006 of the change of the 8
th Directive of the EU. We identify the economic crisis from 2008 the 
second breaking point for the behavioral cost of the audit fee, emerging a not-identified evolution.  
Our study is structured as it follows: a diachronic analysis on the evolution of the audit fee 
and  its determinants, based on auditing  followed by  basis the employed research  methodology; 
preparing the analysis is done together with discussing the obtained results and finally presenting 
some concluding remarks. 
 
Diachronic analysis of the cost behavioral - audit fee 
The auditing market and its audit fees is a subject studied both in developed (US, Australia, 
Canada) and emerging economies (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore). However the audit services 
market in  emerging  economies has  been  given  limited  attention.  Hay  and  colleagues  (2006) 
conducted a meta-study examining possible determinants of the amount of audit fees in the last 25 
years (1977-2002). Of  the 88 research  papers  included in their  analysis, only  6 were  related 
to auditing activity in emerging market countries, while 45 were related to United State’s market.  
Hay  (2006)  considered in  the  mentioned  meta-study  that audit  fees determinants are: 
customer size, the overall audit risk, and complexity of the client, customer profitability, owners of 
the company, the degree of competition of market share 
As a diachronic approach the period pre- Savings and loans crisis (S&L Crisis), (so before 
SOX) the  study  on the evolution of audit services fees on regulated markets is characterized by no 
disclosure obligation on the audit fee by the audited nor by the auditor. For the US market only a 
Standard  and  Poor  survey  shows  that  the  audit  fees  evolved  from 0.08% of turnover in  1975 to 
0.1%  of turnover in  2001.  Regarding  fees  post-SOX audit  services they are  characterized as 
follows:  increased with  292%  for  small  firms  audit, increased 245%  for medium 
companies, increased by 63% for top 500 U.S. companies. Also there is an increase from 0.1% to 
0.3% of turnover. 
Empirical  studies on audit fees conducted  in  US  and  Australia  before  2001 (SOX)  shows 
that the audit fee for the first audit mission is significantly lower than the one of a recurrent audit 
mission. Two important studies from US realized by Francis şi Simon  (1988) for the period from 
1979-1984, and Ettredge şi Greenberg (1997), for the period from 1985-1995, shows that the audit 
fee for the first mission are 24% lower that the audit fee for the following missions.  
The  practice  of setting lower initial audit fees have  been  the  subject of  numerous  studies 
because the major impact that could have on the independence of auditors. De Angelo (1981), Chan 
(1999),  and  Whisenent,  Sankaraguruswamy,  Raghunandan  (2003) believe that  the  practice of 
setting  lower  initial  audit  fees  is  due the  following two  factors: cost  of  auditor change, and 
expectations  of the  auditor  to establish higher  fees in  the  following  years.  DeAngelo 
characterize the difference between expected future audit fees and costs of audits as a quasi-rent. 
According to Chan's model (1999) it is considered if it prohibits the reduction of initial audit 
fees  would  be the  immediate  effect of  the  automatically  whooping  growth  of overall audit Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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fees. While Morgan  and  Stöcken’s  model  (1998)  considers the  auditor's  acceptance  of all of  the 
difference between  the  cost  of the  audit  and  the fee  charged for this first year audit,  the  model 
developed  by  Zhang  (1999)  concludes:  the  lowest fees in  the  first  year the  audit is 
basically audit costs,  zero  profit  for  their  activity. The  result of this  fight will be  based  on the 
auditor's ability  to  negotiate  having  the  force  of  quasi-monopoly, and the  client who  has quasi-
monophony power. Also  consider Zhang's  model explicitly for  the  first  time as  a  factor: the 




  The  employed  research  methodology  largely  relies  on  literature  review  particularities. 
Similar to Ivan (2009), we develop a critical and evaluative account of what has been published 
within accounting research literature on audit fee, but while only considering studies that develop 
an empirical approach and a statistical/econometrical model. Therefore, in accordance to literature 
review  methodology  imposed  each  considered  study  to  be  analyzed  by  looking  at  particular 
elements such as: study hypothesis, determinants token into consideration, qualitative factors token 
into  consideration,  econometrical  model  obtained  as  result.  Summary  and  synthesis  is  used  to 
discuss the principal and secondary results obtained through the analyzed researches.  
 
Presenting the analysis and discussing the obtained results 
The relation established between the audit quality and the audit fee has made a study subject 
for  several  researchers.  So  for  the  audit services from  the  United  States of  America,  there  is 
an empirical database that consists of a number of important studies comprising 231980 to 2000 to 
support the  idea  that really big international  auditing  companies (Big4) made audits of higher 
quality than  the  other (DeAngelo(1981)).  Another study  Che-Ahmad  &Houghton  (1996) 
reveals that Big  4 firms arrives  to  a  court  trail  less  often  and  are  less  sanctioned by regulatory 
bodies (SEC, in this case), both arguments suggesting a much higher success rate of the audit. 
Using  a  geographical  delineation  we  can  identify  several  countries  with  a  good 
representation  for these  studies. In the  US the  problematic of audit  fee and the  its  influencing 
factors was analyzed  since 1980  by D. Simunic to develop a  theory  of market pricing audit 
support his theory bringing in a series of convincing evidence. Z. Palmrosemade (1986) published a 
study  on the  relationship  between  auditor  fees  and audited  size and Francis J. and D. Simon in 
1987 conducted a test audit pricing in small-customer segment of the  market for audit services of 
the United States.  
In the  same  period in Australia is  published  a study by J Francis (1984),  regarding  the 
auditor  size effect on  the price of audit services,  and  with  D. Stokes,  J. Francis continued  his 
studies in  the  same  direction and  published in  1986, empirical  studies based  on the Australian 
market for  audit services establishing  a  correlation  between  audit  fees  and their fields  of 
activity of the audited entity. 
In  Britain,  P. Chan and collaborators published in  1994,  a  study revealing the  most 
important components of audit  fees for  audits  of listed  companies  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
and Brinn,  Peel  and  Roberts  continued  the  studies  of  their  predecessors  and  walk  through an 
exploratory  study in  1994 presenting  the most  important components of  audit  fees  for 
larger entities not traded and independent entities in the UK. 
An important place in literature  is allocated to  country analysis, market audit  services and 
audit fees. In India, D. Simon published together with a team of collaborators an empirical study in 
1986 on  the market for  audit  services and audit  fees of India.  Similar  studies  were 
conducted for Hong  Kong,  Malaysia,  and Singapore  by L. Low  and colleagues, who  published in 
1990, an  analysis  of  the  elements  determining  the  audit    fees for audit  services, 
and D. Simon with collaborators,  published  in  1992, a  comparative  study  between audit services Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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markets of  the  three  countries.  In New  Zealand,  M. Firth published in  1984  an  analysis 
of audit fees and their  determination methods  and in Canada, Chung and Lindsay in  1988 
conducted a  study  on audit market  prices,  the  Canadian perspective  and  Anderson  and  Zéghal 
published in 1994, studies on audit fees from Canadian audit market.  
For Japan despite functional economy experienced an economic boom being investigated as 
such, though exceptionally there  aren’t  any  studies  in  this  area earlier  than 1997, 
when Professor Taylor has published a study of audit services market in Japan. In the same year in 
Pakistan  Professors  Simon D. and  Taylor conducted  a  survey  of audit  services in  the 
country, expanding its research and on South Korea in 1999. 
For the EU audit market space we do not have many studies related to this issue in France 
Gonthier-Besacier, N., Schatt A. (2007)establish the determinants of audit fees for French quoted 
firms. Also the particularities of the audit market, where two (joint) auditors are required by law 
creates a unique setting to study if a firm’s ownership structure affects its auditor-pair choice as 
well the consequences on earning quality Francis, Richard Vanstraelen (2009) 
 in Romania Pop At., Iosivan R (2008) investigate the evolution of the audit fee for the 
Romanian market, but just for a part of the country, no industry related parameters, or size.  
Research in the development of models to quantify audit fees dating back to the early 80s, of 
course they were made on non-regulated markets Sullivan, M. W., (2000),. Starting with the study 
conducted by  Simunic (1980),  a great  number  of  researches  examined  the micro-
economic climate for audit services market.  
One of the most sophisticated model, is the Carson/Fargher/Simon (2004), developed on 
the Australian audit market for the period from 1995-1999.  
They  have built the  model trying to  capture  the individual  characteristics of  the 
client by the following some parameters: the size of the entity have used natural logarithm Total 
Assets; complexity  of the  audit  process is surprised by the  number  of  subsidiaries  to  the 
entity, and the  percentage  of foreign  subsidiaries,  the audit  risk  is  surprised  by the  following 
parameters: current  assets / total assets, treasury, long-term  debt / total assets,  income before  tax / 
total assets, the  indicator of  opinion  (dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  qualified 
opinion, and zero otherwise) recent loss indicator (dummy with value 1 for a loss in any of the past 
three years, 0 otherwise) was also used for assessing an indicator showing either to belong or not to 
the mining industry, an indicator was introduced in a model that illustrates the relationship quantify 
the complexity  of the  relationship  between auditor and  audited is  the  natural 
logarithm of auditor services  paid (thousand  dollars)  (this indicator was  taken  from 
the model Ezzamel,  Gwilliam and Holland (2002)) eventually researchers introduced an  (dummy), 
an indicator for the auditor’s being from the former  Big 6şi 0 otherwise. 
ln(cuantum)  =  α  +  β1ln(Total  Active)  +  β2Subs  +  β3Străine  +  β4Minier  +  β5CATA  + 
β6Quick+ β7Leverage + β8ROI + β9Opinion + β10YE+ β11Loss + β12 ln (Other Services) + 
β13 Big 6 + ε [1] 
ln(cuantum)=audit fee; 
Total Active = Total assets;  
Subs = Radical  complexity of the audit process is surprised by the number of subsidiaries to the 
entity; 
Străine = percentage of foreign subsidiaries; 
Minier  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  being  in  the  mining  industry,  and  zero 
otherwise;  
Quick = trezoreria; 
Leverage = datorii pe termen lung/total active; 
ROI= Return on investmnt ; 
Opinion = dummy indicator variable with value 1 for a qualified opinion, and zero otherwise;  
YE  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  the  fiscal  year  that  does  not  end  on  the  1 Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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June, and zero otherwise 
LOSS  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  any  loss  within  the  last  three 
years, and zero otherwise 
Other Services =  natural logarithm for any other services paid to the auditor (thousand dollars) 
Big  6  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  the  auditor  being  in  the  BIG 
4, and zero otherwise; 
A second very interesting model  is the one developed by Mitra S., Hossain M., Deis R 
(2007)  on  the  US  audit  market  tries  to  quantify  the  audit  fee  in  relation  to  the  property 
characteristics of the entity’s. In the first phase of the study they investigated empirical relationship 
between ownership characteristics of the entity and the amount of fees. The starting point was that: 
the  level  of sophistication and  the  extent  to  which  property  ownership is  complex, in 
terms of number  of large owners  has  a substantial  impact in  monitoring  the business  entity, 
including the  financial  reporting  process.  Next they  studied the  connection  between the  distance 
from  bottom  to  top  management,  the  effect on interpretations and 
ultimately financial reporting performed randomly.  
They  used  a  selection  of 358 entities listed  on the New York, audited by  a  companies 
belonging  to  the Big 5, and  the  hypotheses confirmed  were: there  is  a direct 
relationship of dependence between institutional share owners  and  audit  fee  but  not  of  great 
importance (less 5%), and  a negative  significant  relationship between  the  important  owners of 
shares, (over  5%) and  the  audit  of fees. Furthermore it  has  been  shown that  the  ownership  of 
shares by top management is negatively dependent on the audit fees, but there was no possibility to 
establish a link between individual shareholders with more than 5% and the audit fees. 
We  can conclude that in  establishing a connection  for the audit  fee  for the U.S. market 
an important  factor   is  the  user's  external financial  accounting information, so  important  that it 
can quantify in a audit fee model We consider that motivation granting such importance should be 
seen in terms of attracting the auditor's liability in the entity's financial statement.  
LAFEE = β0 + β1 LTA + β2 SUB + β3 REC + β4 INV + β5 LOSS + β6 FOROPR + β7 +β8 MB 
+ β9 LEV + β10 ROA + β11 FCF + β12 CEOIND + β13 BDMT 
+β14 BDEXP + β15 BDINDP + β16 ACIND + β17 ACMEET + β18 ACEXP 
+β19 DINST + β20 BLOCKINST + β21 BLOCKNINST + β22 PMGR + ε 
Independent:  
LAFEE = LN audit fee   
Dependent variables to establish companies control:  
LTA= ln of Total Assets  ;  
SUB = square root of the no of subsidiaries; 
REC = Money to be collected/ Total Assets  
INV = Total Current Assets / Total Assets;  
LOSS  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  any  loss  within  the  last  three 
years, and zero otherwise;  
FOROPR = Export Sales / Total Assets;  
MB = Current assets / Current liabilities;  
LEV = Long term loans / Total Assets;  
ROA = Return on Assets; 
FCF = Free Cash Flow;  
Dependent variables to establish relation to top-management  
CEOIND=  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for   the  situation  of  President  of  the 
administrative Borad is one and the same with the General Manager, and zero otherwise 
BDMT = square roots onthe number of meetings of the Board of Directors;  
BDEXP= Degree of experience of the Administrative Board , square roots from the numbers on the 
Administrative Board  with  no managerial position in the company ;  Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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BDINDP= Procentage of non- specialists in the Board;  
Dependent variables to characterize Audit Committee   
ACIND  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for Audit  Committee  with  members 
independent, and zero otherwise 
ACMEET = dummy indicator variable with value 1 for Audit Committee who has 4 or meeting a 
year, and zero otherwise;  
ACEXP = dummy indicator variable with value 1 for Audit Committee with at least a member with 
finance and accounting experience, and zero otherwise;  
Dependent variables regarding ownership  
DINST = Degree of repartisation of the stocks at an institutional level 
BLOCKNINST = Degree of stocks owned by non-institutional persons, whom together have 5% , 
or more;  
PMGR = Percentage of the stocks owned by top management;  
It is relevant for our research to present a third model for the audit fee Higgs J.L and Skantz 
T.R. (2006) that takes into consideration the earning made and the market’s reaction. The research 
investigates the US market for 2000-2011, on 1331 US companies listed to NYSE. They first tested 
(on the 5 February 2001- for the first time according to SOX it was mandatory to publish audit fees) 
the following hypothesis: there is a link between the audit fee and the non-audit fees for the same 
client, proved positive at an average coefficient   
The construction of the model was:  
AFi = βo + β1NAFi + β2TAi + β3SQSEGSi + β4SQEMPLSi + β5DAi + β6 LIQi+ β7IVRECi + 
β8ROAi  +  β9INITIALi  +  β10BIG5i+  β11FOROPSi  +  β12LOSSi  +  β13GR_SALESi  + 
β14VOLATILITYi+  β15EMP_PLANi  +  β16BMi+  β17SDOPSi+  β18CHGPBi+  β19RESTATESi+ 
β20RETURNi+ β21LAGi+ β22NEW_FINi+ β23INST_PCTi 
AF = audit fee (natural lograrithm); 
NAF= non-audit fees (natural lograrithm);;  
TAi =Total Assets (natural lograrithm);;  
SQSEGS = square roots from the industrial segments in wich the company activates;  
SQEMPLS = square roots from emplyee number;  
DA = Debt / Assets; 
LIQ = Current assets / current liabilities 
INVREC = Stocks / Total Assets;  
ROA = Return on Assets; 
INITIAL  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for the  first  year  in  the  audit  process 
Audit, and zero otherwise; 
BIG5  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  the  auditor  being  in  the  BIG 
5, and zero otherwise; 
FOROPS = dummy indicator variable with value 1 for a currency revenue or expense for the last 
year, and zero otherwise; 
LOSS  =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for a  any  loss  within  the  last  three 
years, and zero otherwise;  
GR SALES = Income from sales; 
VOLATILITY=  the covariance of the market model (stocks evolution in) a period of time 255 
days/ to 5 days; 
EMP  PLAN    =  dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for an  existing  retirement  plan  and 
zero otherwise; 
XDOPS  =    dummy  indicator variable with value  1 for an  existing  retirement  plan  and 
zero otherwise; 
CHGPB = if there is any change in the solvency of the company  
RETURN = Stocks / Total sales; Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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LAG = quantifying the number of days up to the public release of financial statements;  
This model is interesting because it captures a series of determinants not found in any other 
audit fee model, like: VOLATILITY –the covariance of the market model (stocks evolution in) a 
period of time 255 days/ to 5 days; RESTATE indicator that tries to quantify the relationships of the 
company with the control bodies, and the last LAG parameter – quantifying the number of days up 
to the public release of financial statements, trying to surprise the psychological impact on entities.  
For Romania we identify the construction of a simpler model Pop At. Iosivan R. (2008) 
beginning  with  the  test  of  six  parameters,  and  constructing  a  functional  model  just  with  three 
parameters:  
Amount = 0+ 1Total Assets +2Turnover+3Number of employees; 
Analyzing the most important models we consider important presenting the focal point: all 
of them are linear regression models; all of the models quantify size through a wide ranged of 
parameters,  most  of  them  quantify  qualitative  factors  through  dummy  variable.    All 
models encountered in practice are linear models for assessing the audit fees, regardless of the form 
in which it has logarithmic or not. 
We identify a need for  future researches it is necessary a segmental approach of the market, 
the common rule is a segmental approach of audit services according to the following criteria: both 
their legal and statutory obligation and denomination as business segment, size of audited entity, 
and the criterion of geographical delimitation of entity location can also be found. 
In our opinion the Qualitative parameters quantifiable by means of dummy variables to be 
taken into consideration for the future quantification models are as follows: auditor’s membership 
or non-membership of BIG4 , subsidiary  auditor’s functioning as body corporate or self-employed 
person, existence of foreign subsidiaries of audited entity, auditor’s opinion, whether pertinent or 
not, existence of a clash of interests at the level of top management (it is possible to have the 
general manager involved by holding  or not holding shares), existence or inexistence of controls to 
operate significant corrections performed by Inland Revenue Service. 
 
Concluding remarks 
It  seems  appropriate  to  conclude  on  all  of  these  researches  conducted  in  the  auditing 
research literature by highlighting the role they play in the process of establishing the audit fee, the 
contribution they bring to identifying various aspects those outcomes from the specificities of the 
audit market in various economies. Researchers concerned with the audit fee establishing process, 
are authors of unbiased analytical works. While regulating organisms do not a have a saying into 
this process, there is multiple factor that we must take into consideration that lead to the elaboration 
of the audit fee. The research activities are the one which provide necessary information for that 
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